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Intellectual Property
by Laurence P. Colton*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys legal developments in the area of intellectual
property relevant to the Eleventh Circuit during the 2011 calendar year.
This year, the developments will be presented in a different manner. In
recent years, national and state case law has been the primary driver of
the developments. However, in 2011, the more interesting and more
pertinent drivers have been statutory and practical in nature, both
national and international, yet all equally pertinent to the practice of
intellectual property law in the State of Georgia.
Intellectual property law comprises several discrete yet overlapping
areas of law. The four primary areas of intellectual property law
historically are patent law, trademark law, copyright law, and trade
secret law.' As the basis for patent law and copyright law are provided
for in the United States Constitution,' these statutes and cases are
based in federal law and are for the most part litigated in federal courts.
As trademark law and trade secret law have both federal' and state
aspects, the statutes and cases regarding these areas are based on
* Partner in the firm of Smith Risley Tempel Santos LLC, Atlanta, Georgia. Tufts
University (B.S.Ch.E., 1982); Emory University (J.D., 1987). Member, State Bar of
Georgia. Registered to practice before the United States Patent and Trademark Office.
1. Some secondary areas that will not be surveyed in this Article include trade dress
and know-how. Further, as most precedential decisions are under federal law, this Article
will not include cases from the state courts.
2. Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution provides that "The
Congress shall have Power . . [to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Authors/Writings refers to
copyright, and Inventors/Discoveries refers to patent.
3. Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution is the Commerce
Clause, which forms the constitutional basis for federal trademark and unfair competition
legislation, and provides that "The Congress shall have Power . .[to regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States . . . ." U.S. CONST. art. I,
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federal or state law, and these statutes and cases are litigated in federal
and state courts. All statutes, cases, and events that touch upon
intellectual property are not included, but instead, selected drivers that
are of more significance or interest or that may indicate a particular
direction in the relevant areas of law are covered. While the drivers
discussed often have multiple issues, only the more relevant or
interesting intellectual property issues are discussed.
II.

THE AMERICA INVENTS ACT

The America Invents Act (AA)4 contains the most comprehensive and
significant changes made to Title 35 of the United States Code since
1952, and was the primary driver for intellectual property in 2011.
Signed into law by President Barack Obama on September 16, 2011, the
AIA has thirty-seven sections containing changes to many aspects of the
U.S. Patent Laws, all of which are of great interest to patent practitioners, many of which have an interest to inventors, and about half a
dozen of which should have an interest to the legal world in general.5
The AIA contains a general effective date provision in Section 35, which
states that except as otherwise provided, the provisions of the AIA "take
effect upon the expiration of the 1-year period beginning on the date of
the enactment of this Act[, September 16, 2011,] and apply to any patent
issued on or after that effective date."
The AIA includes significant changes to the U.S. Patent Laws,
including bringing the U.S. Patent Laws more in line with the patent
laws of other countries. The practice of patent law has long been
international in nature, much more so than many other areas of law.
However, the U.S. Patent Laws have remained relatively stagnant when
compared to the patent laws of other countries, many or most of which
have constantly evolved to cooperate with each other, if not parallel each
other. Portions of the AIA help to bring the United States more into the
international community of patent laws.
Several of the most interesting changes include (a) changing from the
first to invent to the first inventor to file, (b) broadening the scope of
prior art, (c) broadening prior user rights, (d) changing the best mode
requirement, (e) adding a post-grant opposition procedure, (f) eliminating
some types of false marking lawsuits, and (g) prohibiting patents from

4. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (to be
codified at 35 U.S.C.).
5. See generally id.
6. Id. § 35, 125 Stat. at 341.
7. See, e.g., id. § 3(a), 125 Stat. at 285 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 100).
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issuing on a human organism." Although there are many other changes
to the U.S. Patent Laws in the AIA, most would likely be of interest only
to the patent practitioner or to the academic.
Changing from the First to Invent to the FirstInventor to File
Section 3 of the AIA changes the U.S. Patent Laws to allow the
granting of a patent to the "first inventor to file" a patent application on
9
an invention, rather than the historic "first to invent" the invention.
The AIA does not change the underlying definition of what an inventor
is, in that one must still be an inventor in order to apply for and receive
a U.S. patent. Therefore, the AIA does not change the U.S. to a "first to
file" system, thus satisfying the language of the U.S. Constitution. In
a "first to file" system, which a number of other countries have, the first
person to file a patent application, whether or not the inventor, can
obtain the patent.
Replacing the "first to invent" criteria with the "first inventor to file"
criteria should have little to no practical effect on inventorship. Of all
of the patent interferenceso filed each year in the United States Patent
and Trademark Office (USPTO), fewer than twenty are decided in favor
of the second inventor to file." To put this into perspective, over
200,000 patent applications now are filed each year with the USPTO,
and over 100,000 patents are issued. 12 Thus for all practical purposes,
this section of the AIA essentially codifies what already exists.

A.

Broadening the Scope of PriorArt
Section 3 of the AIA also simplifies the definitions of what counts as
prior art.'3 In effect, by eliminating several exceptions as to what
B.

8. See discussion infra Parts ILA-H.G.
9. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 3(a), 125 Stat. at 285.
10. A patent interference is a process conducted by the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences (BPAI or Board) of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
to determine priority of inventorship when two different applicants have filed patent
applications with conflicting (identical or patentably indistinct) claims. 35 U.S.C. § 135
(2006), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 3(i), 125 Stat. at 289.
11. See generally James Yang, FirstInventor to FileSystem Under the America Invents
Act, OC PATENT LAWYER (Oct. 21, 2011), http://ocpatentlawyer.com/first-inventor-to-filesystem-under-the-america-invents-act/.
12. See U.S. PatentStatisticsReport, USPTO.GOV,http://www.uspto.gov/webloffices/actido/oeip/taflus-stat.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2012).
13. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 3(a)-(c), 125 Stat. 285-87 (to be codified at
35 U.S.C. §§ 102-03). "Prior art" is the body of knowledge currently in existence, and is
applied by the USPTO examiners when examining a patent application for patentability.
As two of the criteria for patentability are that the invention must be "new" and "non-
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constitutes prior art, most prior art now will be a bar to patentability.
For example, the AIA expands the scope of materials that may be
considered prior art by eliminating from 35 U.S.C. § 10214 the "in this
country" limit on prior art, resulting in the ability to attack any patent
or patent application by evidence of prior public use of the invention
anywhere in the world." As a practical matter, it will become increasingly important to conduct prior art searches, and to conduct broader
prior art searches, by both the patent applicant and accused infringers
as a result of this change.
Rather than having a number of exceptions to what constitutes prior
art, the AIA has simplified this section of the U.S. Patent Laws: the
effective filing date of a patent application now will include the filing
date of any prior foreign application on which the applicant relies, any
prior public disclosure of the invention more than one year before the
effective filing date of a patent application will continue to be a statutory
bar to obtaining a patent, and prior public use or sale anywhere in the
world, rather than just in the United States, will be a statutory bar to
obtaining a patent."

However, there are two important exceptions to the prior art rule.
First, prior art disclosures made publicly available one year or less
before the effective filing date of the patent application can be overcome
by a showing that the prior art disclosure was by a person who obtained
the subject matter from the applicant," or the applicant publicly
disclosed the subject matter before the date of the prior art disclosure."8
Also, applicants can now rely on common ownership or joint research
agreement provisions to overcome prior art rejections.19

C.

BroadeningPrior User Rights

Section 5 of the AIA broadens prior user rights in defending patent
infringement claims."0 Historically, prior user rights have been a
defense to patent infringement that prevents people who have previously
used the patented invention from being liable for patent infringement.
For example, people may have been using the patented invention as a
obvious" in view of the prior art, see id. § 3(c), 285 Stat. at 287, what constitutes prior art
obviously is important to the inventor.
14. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 3(b), 125
Stat. at 287.
15. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 3, 125 Stat. at 287.
16. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 3(a)-(b), 125 Stat. at 285-86.
17. Id. § 3(b), 125 Stat. at 286 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1)(A)).
18. Id. (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1)(B)).
19. Id. (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102(c)).
20. See id. § 5(a), 125 Stat. at 297 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 273).
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trade secret process prior to the process being patented by another.
Essentially, under the prior user rights defense, a patent owner cannot
sue one who has prior user rights for patent infringement because they
have been using the patented invention, even if secretly, prior to the
invention being patented." This provision of the AIA increases the
value of trade secret protection instead of, or in addition to, patent
protection for inventions that can be kept secret while being commercially exploited.
The AIA will allow the prior user rights defense to be raised if a
person, acting in good faith, commercially used the subject matter in the
United States and the commercial use occurred at least one year prior
to either the filing of a patent application or a public disclosure,
whichever is earlier.22 The prior user rights defense is a personal
defense that cannot be conveyed to others, unless it is acquired through
a bona fide transfer of the entire business to which the defense
relates.2 3 The prior user rights defense also will only apply to those
locations where the commercial use was prior to the later of the effective
filing date of the invention or the date of the assignment or transfer of
the business.24 Practically speaking, the prior user rights defense only
becomes an issue when the prior use is secret, as public prior use would
be considered prior art and otherwise capable of invalidating the patent
claim.
An important exception to the prior user rights defense is that the
defense cannot be raised against inventions that were "at the time the
invention was made, owned or subject to an obligation of assignment to
either an institution of higher education . . ., or a technology transfer

organization whose primary purpose is to facilitate the commercialization of technologies developed by one or more such institutions of higher
education."" This exception likely has the potential for increasing the
desire for institutions of higher education to engage in and protect
research and development and to license patents owned by institutions
of higher education.

21. See id.
22. Id.
23. See generally Douglas Perry, USPTO: Prior User Rights Essential to Support
Innovation, TOMSGUIDE (Jan. 25, 2011) http://www.tomsguide.com/us/1aw-governmentcongress-patent-uspto,news-13932.html.
24. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 5(a), 125 Stat. at 298 (to be codified at 35
U.S.C. § 273(e)(1)(C).
25. Id. § 5(a), 125 Stat. at 298 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 273(e)(5)).
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Changing the Best Mode Requirement
Section 15 of the AIA eliminates the best mode requirement as a basis
for invalidating a patent in a patent validity or infringement proceeding.26 However, this change does not affect the requirement to disclose
the best mode during the patent examination process, which is an
interesting paradox. 27 One requirement for obtaining a patent is the
disclosure of the best mode of the invention known to the inventor at the
time of the invention.2 8 That requirement was extended to patent
validity and infringement proceedings and, if absent or intentionally
misleading, could result in the invalidation of the patent. The AlA
eliminates the best mode invalidity defense by amending the list of
defenses to patent infringement to exclude "failure to disclose the best
mode.""
Practically speaking, as 35 U.S.C. § 11230 continues to require that
the best mode be included in the patent application, the AIA simply
prevents an accused patent infringer from asserting a defense based on
USPTO examiners will still
the failure to disclose the best mode.
have the authority to reject patent claims for failure to disclose the best
mode.3 ' This change is favorable to the inventor and the patent
practitioner in that while the patent still must include the best mode, if
the patent issues without the best mode or with a mode that the
inventor knew was not the best mode, the patent cannot be invalidated
for this reason.

D.

E. Adding a Post-GrantReview Procedure
Section 6 of the AIA introduces a post-grant review period.33 Under
the new post-grant review system, any third party may file a request to
cancel patent claims as unpatentable by asserting an invalidity
argument and providing evidence to support the assertion.34 Currently,

26. Id. § 15, 125 Stat. at 328 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 282(a)(3)).
27. See id.
28. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 4(c), 125
Stat. at 296.
29. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 15, 125 Stat. at 328 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C.
§ 282(a)(3)(A)).
30. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 4(c), 125
Stat. at 296.
31. See id.; Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 15, 125 Stat. at 328.
32. See 35 U.S.C. § 112.
33. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 6(d), 125 Stat. at 305 (to be codified at 35
U.S.C. § 321).
34. Id. § 6(d), 125 Stat. at 305-06 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 321-22).
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post-grant review of the patentability of patent claims only occurs in
very limited and arguably archaic instances, and, under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102
and 103," only based on prior art.16 These limitations on third party
involvement effectively prevent the public from challenging patents,
except by way of an expensive and lengthy civil suit.
Under the new post-grant review proceeding, a petitioner may request
to cancel as unpatentable one or more claims of a patent on any ground
relating to invalidity, that is, under 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, or 112
(except for best mode).37 Any person who is not the owner of the patent
and who has not previously filed a civil action challenging the validity
of a claim of the patent may file a post-grant review petition, which
must be filed within nine months of the grant of the patent.3 8 To
prevent concurrent actions, the AIA includes provisions preventing a
post-grant review if a civil action is already pending and for staying a
civil action if a post-grant review has already commenced." Further,
after a post-grant review has concluded, the petitioner is estopped from
raising grounds of invalidity in proceedings arising under 28 U.S.C.
§ 133840 (before the USPTO or the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC)) that were not raised during the post-grant review proceed-

ing.4 1

The new post-grant review process provides for two very important
changes. First, the public now can be more easily involved in the
patenting process to assist in preventing unpatentable devices or
processes from being patented. Second, once the post-grant review has
been carried out and a patent found to be valid, it is more difficult to get
that proverbial second bite at the apple in trying to invalidate a patent.

35. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-03 (2006), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 3, 125
Stat. at 285-88.
36. The instances are (1) when an applicant files an application to reissue a patent and
requests correction of at least one error in the patent, (2) when an interference is declared
between the patent and a pending application, and the applicant in the interference seeks
judgment based on unpatentability of patent claims, (3) when a patent owner or a thirdparty requests reexamination of the patent, and (4) when the Director of the USPTO
initiates reexamination of a patent on his or her own initiative. See id.
37. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act §§ 3, 6(d), 125 Stat. at 285-88, 306.
38. Id. § 6(d), 125 Stat. at 306-307 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 321, 325).
39. Id. § 6(d), 125 Stat. at 307 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 325(a)(1)).
40. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2006).
41. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 6(d), 125 Stat. at 307 (to be codified at 35
U.S.C. § 325(e)(2)).
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EliminatingSome Types of False Marking Lawsuits
Section 16 of the AIA changes the U.S. Patent Laws to eliminate
certain false marking lawsuits.42 Under the U.S. Patent Laws, a patent
owner must mark the patented invention in order to collect damages in
This requirement provides notice to the
an infringement action.'
public that the invention is covered by a U.S. patent. Prior to the AIA,
any individual could bring a qui tam action under 35 U.S.C. § 292(a)"
based on products that are mismarked as covered by a patent.4 5
Section 292(a) provided for substantial statutory fines of $500 per
"offense," which in some cases the courts have interpreted to mean per
individual item," and which could add up to hundreds of millions of
dollars in fines for popular products.47 Half of the fine would go to the
U.S. Government, and the other half to the qui tam plaintiff.4 This
gave rise to a cottage industry of qui tam plaintiffs searching for any
instance of a marking that possibly could be construed as a false
marking.
Under the AIA, only the U.S. Government will be able to sue for
statutory damages for false marking.49 If a private party sues under
the false marking provisions, the private party will be entitled only to
compensatory damages based on "competitive injury" flowing from the
false marking." This will prevent qui tam actions by parties seeking
only to collect half of the $500 fine.

F

No Patent May Issue on a Human Organism
Section 33 of the AIA codifies the provision that "no patent may issue
on a claim directed to or encompassing a human organism."" Although
this provision has support across the political spectrum, it can be argued
that it is not a significant change and that it is inexact. First, the
G.

42. See id. § 16(b), 125 Stat. at 329 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 292).
43. 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2006), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act passim.
44. 35 U.S.C. § 292(a) (2006), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 16(b),
125 Stat. at 329.
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Forest Group, Inc. v. Bond Tool Co., 590 F.3d 1295, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
47. See 35 U.S.C. § 292(a).
48. Id. § 292(b).
49. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 16(b), 125 Stat. at 329 (to be codified at 35
U.S.C. § 292(a)).
50. Id. (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 292(b)); 35 U.S.C. § 292(b).
51. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 33, 125 Stat. at 340 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C.
§ 101(a)).
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USPTO already has a policy of not issuing patents on human organisms.5 2 Second, "human organism" is not defined in the AIA.
Under current USPTO practice, one cannot patent a human. However,
this does not prevent the patenting of, for example, cells, tissue, organs,
or other bodily components if obtained from humans." The purported
patenting of gene sequences has been the topic of much press and
seminars recently, although what is covered by the so-called "gene
patent" may not cover the particular gene itself, but rather a method of
sequencing the gene or of obtaining and handling the gene. However,
even under the USPTO practice, the patenting of, for example, embryos
and fetuses, is not allowed."
It remains to be seen how the courts will interpret "human organism"
and "a claim directed to or encompassing a human organism."" Such
an interpretation could easily range from the current USPTO practice,
to a narrower practice of not allowing the patenting of genes, stem cells,
tissues, synthetic organs, embryos, fetuses, and humans, to a broader
practice of allowing for significant patent rights to everything except for
actual life itself. For the time being, and for practical purposes, the AIA
prohibition on patenting human organisms is not a significant change in
USPTO policy.
III.

ANYONE WANT TO BUY A PATENT PORTFOLIO?

Google buys Motorola Mobility's patents. Google buys IBM patents.
Apple, EMC, Ericsson, and RIM buy Nortel's patents. HTC buys S3
Graphics's patents. What is going on? Is the quest for patents greater
than the quest to innovate? Is it true that "[elverything that can be
invented has been invented"?56 While this technically may not be
considered the subject matter of a survey article, procuring patent
portfolios is becoming a more prevalent basis for allowing a company to
bring or defend infringement actions and to avoid the necessity to
innovate.

52. See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (MPEP) § 2105 (8th ed. rev. July
2010), availableat http://www/uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/index.htm.
53. See generally Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office,
653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
54. See id.
55. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 33, 125 Stat. at 340 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C.

§ 101(a)).
56. Purportedly stated by Charles H. Duell, Commissioner of the U.S. Patent Office,
in 1899. See Rumor Has It, IDEAFINDER.COM (June 23, 2000), http://www.ideafinder.com/guestlarchives/wow-duell.htm.
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The sharp uptick in both the buying and selling activity and the cost
of patent portfolios highlights the growing significance of patents in
2011. Patents have always been a driver of commerce, and now patents
appear to be becoming a new currency of commerce. The prices paid for
patent portfolios indicates the current value of patents, which raises
many questions, two of the most important of which are "why" and "how
high?"
Why are companies suddenly so interested in obtaining patent
portfolios? Companies have always had more than a passing interest in
obtaining patents on their own innovations. For example, a perusal of
the USPTO records shows that Google obtained around 1,200 patents of
But in 2011, companies have shown a strong
its own innovations.
patent portfolios both of competitors and the
the
obtaining
interest in
competitors of competitors. One reason is to leapfrog innovation. If
someone has already invented a device or process, it is often simpler and
less expensive to purchase the rights to the invention than to invent
around or innovate.
However, another reason is a defense or hedge against lawsuits from
competitors. In the case of Google's Android operating system, it has
been called a "suit magnet."5" By obtaining a significant patent
portfolio from a competitor, a company can prevent the competitor from
bringing patent infringement lawsuits against the company. Additionally, by having a larger patent portfolio of its own, a company is less
attractive to another competitor to sue for patent infringement, as the
company now has a larger cache of ammunition to retaliate with its own
patent infringement lawsuits.
How high will the value of patent portfolios go? In 2011, Google
purchased a portfolio of over 1,000 patents from IBM. 9 Why? To
"bolstern[ its strategy of defending against smartphone lawsuits" and "to
counter a 'hostile, organized campaign' by companies including Apple
Inc. and Microsoft Corp. against the Android operating system for mobile
devices."o Later in 2011, Google obtained a portfolio of over 17,000

57. USPTO Patent Full-Text and Image Database,USPTO.GOV, http://patft.uspto.gov
(last visited May 1, 2012).
58. Philip Elmer-DeWitt, Consortium Led by Apple Buys Nortel's Patents for $4.5
billion, CNNMONEY(July 1, 2011),http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2011107/01/consortium-led-byapple-buys-nortels-patents-for-4-5-billion/.
59. Susan Decker & Brian Womack, Google Buys 1023 IBM Patentsto Bolster Defense
of Android, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-0914/google-purchases-1-023-patents-from-ibm-to-bolster-portfolio.html.
60. Id.; see also Kat Asharya, Google Buys 1,000 IBM Patents,BostersAndroid Against
Lawsuits, MOBILEDIA (July 29, 2011), http/www.mobiledia.comi/news/100593.html.
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patents with the purchase of Motorola Mobility for $12.5 billion."
Google tried to purchase 6,500 patents from Nortel, but a consortium led
by Apple and Microsoft offered more, over $4.5 billion. 2
Companies are not hiding their reasons for purchasing patent
portfolios. Google CEO Larry Page blogged:
We recently explained how companies including Microsoft and Apple
are banding together in anti-competitive patent attacks on Android.
The U.S. Department of Justice had to intervene in the results of one
recent patent auction to "protect competition and innovation in the
open source software community" and it is currently looking into the
results of the Nortel auction. Our acquisition of Motorola will increase
competition by strengthening Google's patent portfolio, which will
enable us to better protect Android from anti-competitive threats from
Microsoft, Apple and other companies.'
In other words, Google spent $12.5 billion to acquire patents to help
ensure that Android can survive the legal complaints Google currently
faces and may face in the future. For these reasons, the price paid for
a patent portfolio will rise as high as necessary to ensure that a
company will be able to practice and protect its intellectual property.
Patent portfolio purchases and running lawsuits between and among
competing companies indicate that 2011 was the year that protecting
inventions became both a horizontal activity and a vertical activity.
Obtaining patents both on internal innovation and on external patent
purchases helps increase the size of a company's arsenal, while engaging
in innovation and litigation helps increase the weapons in a company's
arsenal.
IV. CASES
The year 2011 had several important case decisions in the intellectual
property arena. Several of the more interesting case decisions in four of
the primary areas of intellectual property are covered in this Article.

61. Paul Sawers, Motorola Acquisition Means Google Gets 17,000 Patents, 3 Times
Nortel's, with 7,500 Pendings,THENExTWEB.COM (Aug. 15, 2011), http://thenextweb.com
/google/2011/08/15/motorola-acquisition-means-google-gets-17000-patents-with-7500pending/.
62. Evelyn M. Rush, Quest for Patents Brings New Focus in Tech Deals, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 16, 2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/08/16/quest-for-patents-brings-in-techdeals/.
63. Larry Page, Supercharging Android: Google to Acquire Motorola Mobility, THE
OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (Aug. 15, 2011, 4:35 AM), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011108
/supercharging-android-google-to-acquire.html.
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Patent
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.' answered the question
of what needs to be disclosed to the USPTO during the prosecution of a
patent application. Under the U.S. Patent Rules," although a patent
applicant is not required to search to see if the invention is new and
nonobvious, the applicant does have a duty to submit relevant information on the invention of which they are aware.6 6 If the applicant fails
to submit such relevant prior art, the patent may be held unenforceable."
Therasense addressed the consequences of failing to disclose such
relevant information. The inequitable conduct charge in Therasense
arose from the fact that, to obtain allowance of claims in a patent
application, the attorney and the applicant company's director of
research and development distinguished the prior art patent at issue in
the USPTO prosecution of the current patent application-the prior art
patent being the applicant company's own, albeit different, patent-in a
way that contradicted the arguments the attorney and the applicant
company made to get the prior art patent allowed during the prosecution
of the prior art patent application in the European Patent Office (EPO).
Specifically, the attorney and the applicant company did not disclose to
the USPTO examiner the arguments made in the EPO regarding the
patentability of the prior art patent.68 Keep in mind that even though
the USPTO examiner was considering a different set of patent claims in
a different patent application, the prior art patent was cited as reference
against the patentability of the current patent application."
Sitting en banc, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit "tighten [ed] the standards for finding both intent and materiality
in order to redirect a doctrine that has been overused to the detriment
of the public."o The standard the Federal Circuit set for the applicant's state of mind was that "the accused infringer must prove that the
patentee acted with the specific intent to deceive the PTO."" The
standard the Federal Circuit set for the materiality of the nondisclosed
material was that the USPTO "would not have allowed a claim had it

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

649 F.3d 1276 (Fed Cir. 2011) (en banc).
37 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-5.5 (2012).
37 C.F.R. § 1.56.
Id.
Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1283-85.
See id. at 1283.
Id. at 1290.
Id.
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been aware of the undisclosed prior art."72 Both of these standards are
high, and favor the patent applicant over the party attacking the patent
for invalidity.
As a result of the decision in Therasense, inequitable conduct is now
more difficult to prove and is now a much less promising defense to a
patent infringement claim. In fact, in most cases, proving inequitable
conduct to invalidate a patent will now require showing that the prior
art would have invalidated the patent for lack of novelty or for
obviousness. Practically speaking, the decision in Therasense eases the
burden on the patent owner and increases the burden on the party
attacking the patent in a patent invalidity action.
Sanofi-Aventis v. Apotex Inc." answered the question of whether a
parties' settlement agreement allowed for the imposition of prejudgment
interest. Sanofi-Aventis is the patent owner and manufacturer of the
Plavix@, a brand of clopidrogrel bisulfate tablets, which is a drug for
helping to keep blood platelets from sticking together and forming clots.
Apotex is a generic drug manufacturer that filed an abbreviated new
drug application (ANDA) with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) requesting that it be allowed to manufacture a generic version of
the drug and alleging that Sanofi's patent was invalid." Sanofi and
Apotex entered into a limited settlement agreement that any actual
damages for patent infringement would be limited to 50% of Apotex's net
sales of the generic version of the drug if the litigation results in a
judgment that Sanofi's patent is not invalid or unenforceable."
Apotex received approval for and began selling its generic drug.
Sanofi brought a patent infringement action, obtained a preliminary
injunction, and subsequently won the patent infringement trial. The
lower court set the damages at 50% of Apotex's net sales, plus interest,
holding that the parties should be bound by their prior agreement, but
that the agreement only limited damages and did not limit interest. On
appeal, Apotex argued that Sanofi contractually limited its full recovery
to 50% of Apotex's net sales. 6 Sanofi argued that because the agreement did not address prejudgment interest, the lower court correctly
applied the general rule that prejudgment interest should be awarded
as part of an actual damages calculation.

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 1291.
659 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1174.
Id. at 1176.
Id. at 1176-77.
Id. at 1178; see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 655 (1983).
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The Federal Circuit relied both on the contractual language and on the
history of compensatory damages. The traditional calculation of
damages includes a reasonable royalty calculated at the time of
infringement and interest charged for the delay in payment to fully
compensate a patent holder for past infringement." Additionally, the
U.S. Patent Laws provide for the award of "damages adequate to
compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable
royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with
interest and costs as fixed by the court."" However, the Federal
Circuit found "that the parties intended that the phrase 'actual damages'
include all damages necessary to compensate Sanofi for Apotex's
infringement," and excluded an award of prejudgment interest.8 0 The
decision in Sanofi-Aventis holds that parties can contractually limit
damages in a potential patent infringement lawsuit, and gives the
practitioner another option when negotiating a contract. 8 '
Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Manufacturing Corp.82 finally eliminated
the presumption of irreparable harm in the context of injunctive relief.
Historically, once a patent was adjudged infringed, courts would find
irreparable harm and issue an injunction. This rule was recently
contravened by the United States Supreme Court in eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C.;" however, the eBay decision did not explicitly
lay the issue to rest." The Federal Circuit emphatically stated, "We
take this opportunity to put the question to rest and confirm that eBay
jettisoned the presumption of irreparable harm as it applies to determining the appropriateness of injunctive relief."
In Bosch, the patents at issue were for a new technology in the field
of windshield wiper blades. The United States District Court for the
District of Delaware found certain patents both valid and infringed, but
denied Bosch an injunction.8 6 The Federal Circuit reversed, but not on
the historical rule. The Federal Circuit agreed with the lower court
that a finding of infringement does not automatically justify an
injunction, but found that under the four-factor test for determining
whether an injunction should be awarded, Bosch was entitled to an

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Sanofi-Aventis, 659 F.3d at 1179.
35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) (amended 2011).
Sanofi-Aventis, 659 F.3d at 1178.
Id. at 1183.
659 F.3d 1142 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006).
See generally id.
Bosch, 659 F.3d at 1149.
Id. at 1145.
Id. at 1149.
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injunction." The decision in Bosch does not add much to the prior
Supreme Court decision in eBay. However, it will tone down the amount
of attorney and commentator time spent discussing whether the
presumption of irreparable harm following judgment of infringement and
validity survived eBay.
Association for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office" addressed the question of whether human genes are patentable.
Molecular Pathology was filed on behalf of a number of different plaintiff
groups, including researchers, patients, cancer survivors, and scientific
associations, and involved the patentability of the genes BRCA1 and
BRCA2-two mutations of human DNA linked to higher probability of
breast and ovarian cancer. The lawsuit alleged that patents on human
genes violate patent law because genes are products of nature that
cannot be patented.o The Federal Circuit ruled that one can obtain a
patent on the genes but cannot obtain a patent on a method to compare
those gene sequences."
The BRCA gene cases have received a lot of press lately, having
become the poster child for the question of whether human genes can be
patented. 92 Human genes make up the strands of DNA, the famous
double helix that is the blueprint of life. The USPTO issued patents on
isolated BRCA1 and BRCA2 strands of DNA, and process claims for
methods of comparing or analyzing two gene sequences, but not on an
entire human gene or DNA generally. The lower court held that the
patents were invalid as the subject matter claimed was for unpatentable
However, the Federal Circuit reversed in part,
laws of nature."
holding that although genes are not patentable in the form in which they
appear in the body, as these are an unpatentable product of nature, a
patent may issue on genes that have been identified and isolated."

88. Id. at 1148, 1157. The court examined (1) plaintiffs irreparable injury; (2) whether
remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, would be inadequate to compensate
for that injury; (3) the balance of hardships; and (4) the public interest. Id. at 1148.
89. 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
90. Id. at 1333-34; see also 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (amended 2011).
91. Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1334.
92. See, e.g., Andrew Pollack, Despite Gene Patent Victory, Myriad Genetics Faces
Challenges, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2011), http://nytimes.com/2011/08/25/business/despitegene-patent-victory-myriad-genetics-faces-challenges.html?pagewanted=all;
Tiffany
O'Callaghan, Court Rules Against Patenting Human Genes, TIME (Mar. 30, 2010),
http://healthland.time.com/2010/03/30/court-rules-against-patenting-human-genes/.
93. Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1334.
94. Id. at 1351.
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The decision in Molecular Pathology also considered process claims
related to the genes.9" The Federal Circuit held that claims on methods
of comparing or analyzing two gene sequences were not patentable
subject matter as they are abstract mental processes.9 6 However, the
Federal Circuit upheld a claim on a method for screening potential
cancer therapeutics as this claim comprised actual steps for growing host
cells and determining the growth rate of the host cells by manipulating
the cells. 97
The decision returned the state of the law to where it was prior to the
lower court decision. In fact, the lower court decision was the more
surprising decision, in that it was contrary to the Supreme Court
decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty," which was the state of the law
since 1980.99 What will be interesting is the future of the Molecular
Pathology decision in light of the AIA, which inserted a provision in the
U.S. Patent Laws that "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, no
patent may issue on a claim directed to or encompassing a human
organism."' 0 As discussed above, § 33 of the AIA,'' read broadly,
could apply to human genes because the terms "directed to" and
"encompassing" in the AIA are not defined terms. It is likely that
Molecular Pathology will be appealed to the Supreme Court, which may
provide additional guidance as to the future of patents on human genes.
Board of rustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University v. Roche
Molecular Systems, Inc. (Stanford)'o2 answered the narrow question of
whether a university automatically owns the patent right of a university
researcher.'xo Under the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980,104 universities may
elect to patent inventions made through federally-funded research, or
may allow the researchers to seek patents on the inventions.' 5 The
Supreme Court held that Congress did not intend for the Bayh-Dole Act
to overrule one of the original premises of the U.S. Patent Laws-that
rights in an invention belong to the inventor.c'

95. Id.
96. Id. at 1355.
97. Id. at 1357.
98. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
99. Id. at 309-10.
100. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 33, 125 Stat. 284, 340 (to
be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 101).
101. Id.
102. 131 S. Ct. 2188 (2011).
103. Id. at 2192.
104. 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2006 & Supp. 2010) (amended 2011).
105. See 35 U.S.C. § 200.
106. Stanford, 131 S. Ct. at 2198-99.
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In Stanford,a scientist assigned, as part of his employment agreement
with Stanford University, all federally-funded inventions. The scientist
also performed research at Cetus Corporation and signed an agreement
to assign any inventions to Cetus, which later was acquired by Roche
Molecular Systems. Stanford obtained several patents on the scientist's
inventions and sued Roche Molecular Systems for patent infringement.107
The Federal Circuit's decision turned on the language of the assignment.'o The Stanford assignment contained the language "agree[s] to
assign," while the Cetus assignment contained the language "will assign
and do[es] hereby assign."'o According to the Federal Circuit, the
Stanford language was only a promise to assign inventions not yet made
and, under contract law, was insufficient to divest Cetus of title to the
inventions under the "will assign and do[es] hereby assign" language."'0 The Supreme Court did not pass on the Federal Circuit's
interpretation of contract law, but decided the narrow issue of whether
patent rights vest automatically in a university under the Bayh-Dole
Act, or only after the researcher makes the required assignment of
patent rights."'1 The Supreme Court maintained the general rule in
the U.S. Patent Laws that an inventor initially has the right to patent,
which passes only after an effective assignment has been made." 2
This decision clarifies the language necessary in a contract to transfer
an invention. Specific active verbs are necessary that the inventor
assigns the invention.
B.

Copyright
As the New York 'llmes reported on January 12, 2011, the Associated
Press (AP) and the artist Shepard Fairey have settled a copyright battle
over the unlicensed use by Fairey of an AP photograph of Barack
Obama." 3 In 2008, Fairey created a poster entitled "Hope" that used
a stylized version of an AP photograph of President Obama. The AP
sued for copyright infringement, and Fairey asserted that he was
entitled to the fair use exception"' and that he had effectively trans-

107. Id. at 2192-93.
108. Id. at 2194.
109. Id. at 2192 (second alteration in original).
110. Id. at 2192, 2194 (alteration in original).
111. Id. at 2196-97.
112. Id. at 2195.
113. David W. Dunlap, Obama Image Copyright Case Is Settled, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12,
2011), http://lens.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/12/obama-image-copyright-case-is-settled/.
114. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
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formed" the work into an idealized image "that created powerful new
meaning and conveys a radically different message."11 6 Under the
settlement agreement, Fairey did not admit copyright infringement.1 17
Although the settlement may have been advantageous for the parties, it
leaves us in the dark as to whether Fairey's defenses of fair use and
transformation apply in this situation in general or in the use of a
photograph of a U.S. President specifically.
Kernal Records Oy v. Mosley,"' held that first publication of a work
of authorship over the Internet amounts to "simultaneous publication in
the United States and other nations around the world having Internet
service.""' Timothy Mosley is the well-known singer "Timbaland." In
Kernal, a song was originally published on an Australian magazine's
website. U.S.-based Timbaland allegedly copied the work without
authorization in making another song. The copyright owner then sued
Timbaland in the United States.12 0 The United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida held that the initial online posting
was a publication in the U.S. and subject to the procedural requirements
of U.S. law, which requires copyright registration in the U.S. Copyright
Office prior to bringing an infringement lawsuit. 121
The main issue in Kernal was where the work was first published. 1 2 2
Section 411(a) of the U.S. Copyright Act" 3 provides that "no civil
action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall
be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim
has been made." 24 A published work is a "United States work" if:
(1) in the case of a published work, the work is first published(A) in the United States;
(B) simultaneously in the United States and another treaty [the Berne
Convention] party or parties, whose law grants a term of copyright
protection that is the same as or longer than the term provided in the
United States;
(C) simultaneously in the United States and a foreign nation that is
not a treaty party; or

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
Dunlap, supra note 114.
Id.
794 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
Id. at 1357.
Id. at 1358.
Id. at 1360; see also 17 U.S.C. § 411 (2006).
Kernal, 794 F. Supp. 2d at 1360.
17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (Supp. II 2008).
Id.
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(D) in a foreign nation that is not a treaty party, and all of the authors
of the work are nationals, domiciliaries, or habitual residents of, or in
the case of an audiovisual work legal entities with headquarters in, the
United States."
The district court's decision in Kernal confuses what constitutes a
"United States work." All authors, and especially foreign authors,
should take the conservative approach of avoiding a first publication on
the Internet if they want to avoid the presuit registration requirement
of the U.S. Copyright Law. The Kernal decision also emphasizes why
foreign authors should consider timely registration of their works with
the U.S. Copyright Office if they have any desire to protect their works
in the U.S. through the U.S. federal courts. Finally, although not
binding in any other country, the Kernal decision could be used
elsewhere by other courts as dicta that works of authorship published on
the Internet are subject to the procedural requirements of each and
every country.
rademark
Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products L.P v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.12 6
answered the question of whether a functional design is also protectable
by trademark.'2 7
C.

Toilet paper. This case is about toilet paper. Are there many other
things most people use every day but think very little about? We doubt
it. But then again, only a select few of us work in the rarified air
inhabited by top-rate intellectual property lawyers who specialize in
presenting and defending claims of unfair competition and trademark
infringement under the Lanham Act.128
Judge Terrence Evans went on to hold that even a distinctive symbol
may not be a trademark, if it is functional. 2 9
In Georgia-Pacific,the issue turned on whether a quilted design used
on toilet paper is functional.o30 Under U.S. Trademark Law, functional
features are not capable of trademark protection.'
The court in
Georgia-Pacificheld that a "Quilted Diamond Design" used on toilet

125. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. IV 2010).
126. 647 F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 2011).
127. Id. at 727. Although not strictly applicable in Georgia, as Georgia is in the
Eleventh Circuit, this case involves two companies with strong presences in Georgia.
128. Id. at 725.
129. Id. at 731.
130. Id. at 727.
131. Id. at 731. Functional features are left to patent protection. Id.
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paper was functional. 3 2 In reaching that decision, the court relied on
several related patents held by Georgia-Pacific, which discussed the
Specifically, the court found
functional advantages of the design.'
that one advantage of the design according to the related patents is that
"embossing a quilt-like diamond lattice filled with signature designs ...
improves (perceived) softness and bulk, and reduces nesting and
ridging." 3 4
The Georgia-Pacificdecision highlights a conflict between trademark
law and patent law. A functional aspect of an item may be protectable
via a patent, yet protecting that aspect through patent may preclude
protection via trademark, even if that aspect originally was unique to a
single company. Practically speaking, this decision emphasizes the
necessity for a business decision to determine whether one may wish to
protect intellectual property through the use of a trademark or through
the use of a patent, and whether to promote an aspect of a product as
ornamental or as functional.
In re XMH Corp.'a answered the question of whether a trademark
license is assignable in bankruptcy without the licensor's consent.'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
district court's reversal order, thereby permitting the assignment of a
trademark sublicense absent the licensor's consent.a' Until now, the
closest decision on this issue appears to have been in an unpublished
affirmance of the district court's decision in In re N.C.R Marketing
Group, Inc."as
In In re XMH Corp., a bankrupt clothing firm sold its assets to two
buyers. The assets included an executory contract, which the bankrupt
sought to assign to the purchasers. The executory contract included a
license to a trademark. The licensor objected to the assignment of the
executory contract, arguing that the executory contract could not be
assigned because it was a sublicense to the bankrupt of a trademark
licensed by the licensor from a third party. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court
for the Seventh Circuit agreed with the licensor and the bankrupt
appealed."'
The district court reversed, effectively allowing the
original contract to be assigned, and the appeals court affirmed the
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 729.
135. 647 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2011).
136. Id. at 692. This case is not strictly applicable in Georgia, as Georgia in in the
Eleventh Circuit.
137. Id. at 692, 698.
138. 337 B.R. 230, 233-34 (D. Nev. 2005).
139. In re XMH Corp., 647 F.3d at 692.
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district court, holding that if the executory contract included a trademark sublicense when XMH attempted to assign the contract, it was not
assignable. 4 0
One argument raised in contravention to the assignment of the
trademark license without the trademark owner's consent was that the
executory contract constituted an implied trademark sublicense that
could not be sold or assigned absent the consent of the trademark
owner.14 ' On appeal, the court ruled that a trademark license or
sublicense is not assignable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 363 and 365(c)(1)142 because the U.S. Trademark Laws dictate that "the universal
rule is that trademark licenses are not assignable in the absence of a
clause expressly authorizing assignment."'
The decision in In re
XMH Corp. should be applauded by trademark owners, as it confirms
the general idea that a trademark owner would not want a licensee to
be allowed to assign the license without the trademark owner's consent
because the trademark owner would not be able to ensure that the
assignee would meet the quality standards dictated by the trademark
owner.
D. 7-ade Secret
Atlantic Research Marketing Systems, Inc. v. Troy" discussed
whether a patent and a trade secret can coexist. Atlantic Research
involved both trade secret and patent issues-the patent issue being
whether the patentee met the written disclosure and best mode
requirements of the U.S. Patent Laws and the trade secret issue being
whether trade secret could exist in light of the patent disclosure.14 5
For the claims at issue, the Federal Circuit found that the written
disclosure requirement was not met by Atlantic Research Marketing
Systems (ARMS), and the patent claims were held to be invalid. 4 6 For
the trade secret issue, the Federal Circuit was not able to say that no
reasonable jury could have been persuaded that ARMS was in possession
of its alleged trade secret. 47 However, the Federal Circuit never
reached a final holding in the trade secret issue, as the Federal Circuit

140. Id. at 692, 698.
141. Id. at 697.
142. 11 U.S.C. §§ 363, 365(c)(1) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
143.

In re 1MH Corp., 647 F.3d at 695.

144.
145.
146.
147.

659 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1349-50; see also 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (amended 2011).
Atlantic Research, 659 F.3d at 1353.
Id. at 1357.

1304

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

reversed the district court and granted Troy's motion for a mistrial based
on jury instructions. 4 8
ARMS owns a patent for a rifle handguard device. Stephen P. Troy,
Jr. initially had been a distributor for ARMS and later became an
employee of ARMS. As a condition of his employment, Troy signed a
nondisclosure agreement. During his employment with ARMS, Troy also
operated his own company with ARMS's consent. Troy's employment
with ARMS was terminated. Soon thereafter, Troy began to offer rifle
handguard devices that ARMS alleged infringed on its patents. ARMS
also alleged Troy had misappropriated ARMS's trade secrets relative to
the rifle handguard device. However, it appears that ARMS argued both
that the rifle handguard device was covered by its patent, which would
mean that it was publicly disclosed, and covered by trade secret law, and
secret based on the nondisclosure agreement with Troy.' 9 As can be
seen, these arguments appear to be logically inconsistent.
In an interesting twist of a decision, the Federal Circuit held that the
invention was not sufficiently disclosed to be covered by the patent, and
therefore could qualify as a trade secret.'
Practically speaking,
ARMS was left in the tenuous position of not disclosing enough of the
invention to support the patent claims, but possibly disclosing too much
of the invention to support a trade secret claim. The practical impact of
the case is that it supports the use of both patent and trade secret
protection for related technology.
Similar to the Georgia-Pacificdecision discussed above, the Atlantic
Research case highlights a conflict between trade secret law and patent
law. "A trade secret is secret. A patent is not. That which is disclosed
in a patent cannot be a trade secret.""' To maintain a trade secret,
the invention must be kept secret. To obtain a patent, the invention
must be disclosed such that one of ordinary skill in the relevant
technical field can practice the invention. This decision also emphasizes
the necessity for a business decision to determine whether one may wish
to try to protect intellectual property through the use of a trade secret
or through the use of a patent, and whether to promote an aspect of a
product as secret or as patented.
Tewari De-Ox Systems Inc. v. Mountain States/Rosen, L.L.C.'5 2 also

148. Id. at 1361-62.
149. Id. at 1348-50.
150. Id. at 1353.
151. Id. at 1357.
152. 637 F.3d 604 (5th Cir. 2011). The Eleventh Circuit, which includes Georgia, was
carved out of the Fifth Circuit. Although Fifth Circuit decisions are not binding on the
Eleventh Circuit, the Fifth Circuit is our ancestor and our neighbor, and its decisions are
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addressed the inventor's common dilemma between whether to patent
the invention, which requires disclosing the invention to the public, or
keeping the invention as a trade secret, which requires maintaining the
invention as a secret."s' Tewari De-Ox Systems filed a patent application on a meat-packing method and disclosed knowledge about implementing the method to a potential partner subject to a nondisclosure
agreement. The joint venture soured, and the potential partner used the
information. Tewari De-Ox Systems sued for trade secret misappropriation and Mountain States countered that all of the information was
contained in the published patent application.15 4 The United States
District Court for the Western District of Texas granted Mountain
States's motion for summary judgment relating to the trade secret
disclosure, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
reversed this part of the district court's decision.15
Although, as discussed above, the written disclosure of an invention
required in a patent generally destroys trade secret status, the Fifth
Circuit held that a jury was entitled to decide whether the trade secret
combinations alleged by Tewari De-Ox Systems were obvious, or whether
they were secrets that conferred a competitive advantage by being
known only to Tewari De-Ox Systems."' The Fifth Circuit held that
the district court erred by entering judgment in favor of Mountain States
on the trade secrets issue when the district court incorrectly defined
Tewari De-Ox System's trade secrets and failed to consider that a unique
combination of elements that individually may already be publicly
disclosed or generally known to the public are protectable as trade
secrets under the applicable state trade secrets law."' In this situation, the court held that an inventor may have it both ways, in that even
if the individual elements were public information, the knowledge of how
to combine those elements could remain a protected trade secret.5 5
TianRui Group Co. v. International Trade Commissionis5 expanded
the ability of U.S. companies to sue foreign parties for the misappropriation of trade secrets even though a substantial amount of the activity
may have taken place in a foreign country. Generally, if a party uses
trade secret information outside of the United States, that will not
often of interest. Fifth Circuit decisions prior to the formation of the Eleventh Circuit are
still binding precedent on the Eleventh Circuit.
153. Id. at 611.
154. Id. at 607-08.
155. Id. at 608, 611, 615.
156. Id. at 614.
157. Id. at 615.
158. Id.
159. 661 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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violate trade secret law in the United States.o6 0 However, under the
decision in 7ianRui Group, a trade secret holder may be able to have the
International Trade Commission (ITC) block importation of goods made
using the trade secret?"' The Federal Circuit held that the ITC has
authority over "luinfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the
importation of articles . . . into the United States. 6 2
In 21anRui Group, Amsted Industries, a U.S. manufacturer, licensed
a manufacturing process for railway wheels to a third party. TianRui
Group approached Amsted to negotiate a similar license, but the parties
did not reach an agreement. TianRui Group then hired several of the
third party's employees, all of whom had been notified that the Amsted
process was confidential and most of whom had signed confidentiality
agreements, to manufacture devices using the process. The TianRui
Group devices were sold in the United States.'63 Amsted filed a
complaint with the ITC, arguing that the importation of the wheels
violated § 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930,14 as the manufacturing
process was developed in the U.S. and protected under U.S. trade secret
law."' The ITC administrative judge found in favor of Amsted and
issued a limited exclusion order.'6 6
The Federal Circuit interpreted § 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 to mean
that the ITC "has authority to investigate and grant relief based in part
on extraterritorial conduct insofar as it is necessary to protect domestic
industries from injuries arising out of unfair competition in the domestic
marketplace."' 7 The decision does not enjoin continuing the manufacture of the devices because the manufacturing company and the
manufacturing activities were outside of the U.S. Instead, the case holds
that the ITC may block importation of goods into the U.S. that were
manufactured using the trade secrets of a U.S. business.
V. A WATCH LIST FOR 2012

This section will mention cases and issues that are likely to arise or
be decided in the coming year that may affect the intellectual property
legal landscape.

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 1335.
Id. at 1326.
Id. at 1324 (alteration in original); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A) (2006).
TianRui Gp., 661 F.3d at 1324.
19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2006).
TianRui Gp., 661 F.3d at 1325.
Id. at 1326.
Id. at 1324.

2012]

A.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

1307

SOPA/PIPA

The rise and fall of a bill. The U.S. House of Representatives' Stop
Online Piracy Act (SOPA)..s and the sister U.S. Senate Protect
Intellectual Property Act (PIPA)5 s have had an apparent meteoric rise
and fall in the beginning of 2012. If enacted into law, SOPA/PIPA would
expand the ability under U.S. law to fight online trafficking in copyrighted intellectual property and counterfeit goods. Remedies under
SOPA/PIPA include court orders barring violators from conducting
business with infringing websites, barring search engines from linking
to violators' websites, and requiring Internet search providers (ISPs) to
block access to violators' websites. SOPA/PIPA also included criminal
provisions imposing prison terms of up to five years for the unauthorized
streaming of copyrighted material. Spoiler alert! An enormous public
backlash against SOPA/PIPA, based in part on the public's belief that
SOPA/PIPA would threaten free speech, would cause the censoring of the
Internet, and includes egregious criminal penalties, caused the bills'
sponsors to pull the bills in January 2012.

B.

Golan v. Holder

Can the United States government constitutionally pull works out of
the public domain and extend copyright protection? The United States
Supreme Court agreed to hear an appeal of a decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit that in 2010 held the U.S.
government, under the Copyright Term Extension Act,170 could restore
copyright protection to works that have entered the public domain."
Spoiler alert! In January 2012, the Supreme Court held that the U.S.
government could restore such copyright protection.172 The Court
rejected contrary arguments based on the First Amendment and the U.S.
Constitution's copyright clause,7 3 holding that the public domain was
not "a category of constitutional significance" and that copyright
protections might be expanded even if they did not create incentives for
new works to be created.17 4

168. H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011).
169. S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011).
170. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827
(codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
171. Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076, 1080 (10th Cir. 2010); see also Golan v. Holder,
132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
172. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 878.
173. U.S. CONsT. art. I, §8, cl. 8.
174. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 888 n.26.
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C.

Prometheus v. Mayo
What constitutes patentable subject matter under the U.S. Patent
Laws? The Supreme Court agreed to hear an appeal of a decision of the
Federal Circuit, which in 2010 held that personalized medicine patents
covering drug dosage adjustment methods tied to a patient's individual
metabolism do satisfy the requirements of the "machine or transformation" test in the Federal Circuit's decision in In re Bilski 7 5 because the
claimed methods "transform an article into a different state or thing" in
a way that is "central to the purpose of the claimed process.' 7 e The
Supreme Court's decision to review Prometheus v. Mayo'7 7 could be of
great interest to the intellectual property world, as the Supreme Court
could choose to review and clarify basic questions of patentable subject
matter, particularly in the area of medical/diagnostic method patents.
VI.

FINAL NOTES

On the statutory side of intellectual property, the year 2012 was a
banner year with the passage of the AIA. Additionally, the courts heard
and decided cases interpreting some issues of practical importance to the
intellectual property practitioner, such as Therasense, Inc. v. Becton,
Dickson & Co., 7 ' Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office,'79 and Kernal Records Oy v. Mosley.'80 Many of the decided
cases provide additional insight into the notion that intellectual property
practitioners have to be even more careful in the drafting of patents,
licenses, and contracts.

175. 545 F.3d 943, 961-62 (Fed. Cir. 2008), affd, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218
(2010).
176. Prometheus v. Mayo, 628 F.3d 1347, 1355-56 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131
S. Ct. 3027 (U.S. June 20, 2011) (no. 10-1150).
177. 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
178. 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
179. 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
180. 794 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2011).

